CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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REPUBLIC OF POLAND
AND
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Joint Report on a Trial Inspection on Request

INTRODUCTION

1. At the initiative of the Polish side, and pursuant to a bilateral agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland has conducted a trial inspection on request at two Soviet military facilities located on the territory of Poland.

2. The Republic of Poland, which has declared, inter alia, that it does not possess chemical weapons (document CD/985), was the Requesting Party in the exercise.

3. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which has declared, inter alia. that it does not posess chemical weapons on the territories of other States (document CD/CW/WP.264), was the Inspected Party in the exercise.

4. This report presents the outcome of an exercise applicable to an inspection on request on the grounds of suspected storage of chemical weapons.

Aims of the Trial Inspection

5. The aim of the trial inspection on request were:

a) to confirm, insofar as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory;

b) to test in practice the relevant procedures of the Protocol on Inspection Procedures contained in the draft Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be used in case of suspected storage of chemical weapons;

c) to determine the necessary scope of activities which should be carried out by the Inspection Team during the inspection on request at military facilities;

d) to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections.

Facilities inspected

6. The facilities inspected were selected by the Polish side.

7. The first inspected facility was a central artillery depot of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of Poland where different types of artillery munitions have been stored.

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The facility has an administrative area with offices and living quarters and a storage area with bunkers and stores for munitions and open storage areas.

There are road/rail transport entry/exit points at the facility.

8. The second inspected facility was a central chemical depot of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of Poland where means of protection against weapons of mass destruction including those against chemical weapons, are store. At the depot there is an administrative area with offices and living quarters and a storage area where stores, open storage areas and a chemical laboratory are located.

There are road transport entry/exit points at the facility.

9. The inspection was carried out pursuant to the Protocol on the Activities of Inspectors during Inspection agreed between Poland and the USSR based on the draft Convention on Chemical Weapons (CD/1033 of 10 August 1990). The Protocol did not contain provisions relating to definitions, designation of inspectors and inspection assistants, priviledges and immunities, standing arrangements and pre-inspection activities. It was agreed between the Parties that the samples would be analysed on-site. Since there has not been a certified list of approved equipment, both Parties agreed that a list of all inspection equipment would be made available to the Inspected Party for approval at least a week before the inspection.

The observers of the Requesting Party were accorded the same rights, access and information as the inspectors. It was agreed, however, that any request on their part would be made through the Inspection Team Leader.

Composition of the team

10. The Inspection Team consisted of six representatives of the Polish Army, including two munition experts, two chemical weapon detection specialists (with analytical equipment) and two chemical weapon defence experts.

11. The Requesting Party appointed two observers:

- a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- a military expert of the Polish Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.

12. The Inspected Party appointed an escort composed of:

- two representatives from the Ministry of Defence of the USSR familiar with the inspection procedures worked out at the Conference on Disarmament;

- representatives of the inspected facilities, including their commanders, who accompanied the inspectors during the inspection of their respective facilities and assisted the inspectors in the performance of their duties.

Notification and time of inspection

13. The request for the inspection of the first facility was submitted to the Headquarters of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of Poland on 16 April 1991 at 4. p.m. (16 hours prior to the arrival of the Inspection Team at the point of entry). The notification contained the name of the first facility to be inspected, the date and estimated time of arrival of the Inspection Team, the names of inspectors and observers. The notification also indicated that another inspection was planned at a later date.

14. The second notification was submitted to the Headquarters of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of Poland on 17 April 1991 at 5. p.m. (15 hours prior to the arrival of the Inspection Team at the second facility). The notification contained the name of the second facility, the date and estimated time of arrival of the Inspection team. It also confirmed the names of inspectors and observers.

15. The inspection at the munition depot was carried out on 17 April 1991 from 10 a.m. to 8 p.m. The inspection at the chemical depot was conducted on 18 April 1991 from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.

Conduct of the inspection

16. Upon arrival of the Inspection Team at the Headquarters (which played the role of the point of entry) the Commander of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of Poland welcomed members of the Inspection Team, observers and the representatives of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, who were members of the escort.

The Inspection Team Leader informed the Inspected Party of the purposes and tasks of the Inspection Team. During the one-and-a-half hour meeting, representatives of the escort inspected the testing equipment at the disposal of inspectors in order to confirm that the equipment in question met the requirements for this particular type of inspection.

17. For taking and analysing of samples to determine whether or not chemicals listed in Schedule 1 of the draft Convention were present, the Inspection Team had at its disposal photo-ionisation analyzers of organic compound vapours, including organophosphorous (gas detector AIM-2000 and 580A), a portable chemical laboratory PCHL-3 and a mobile chemical laboratory AL-4. The Inspection Team also used the equipment for non-destructive examination of munitions (and ultrasonic thickness meter type 545H and a portable ultra-sonic devide type 543).

The ultrasonic thickness meter (type 545H) was used to measure thickness of munition casing.

The portable ultrasonic device (type 543) served to determine the content of the munition under examination (a solid, loose, or liquid substance). The method of measurement was based on establishing the velocity of propagation of ultrasonic waves in the munition.

18. For the purpose of recording any possible ambugous situations during the inspection, the Inspection team had an instant camera (Polaroid 635) to provide two instant photographs, one for each Party. The Inspectors also used dictaphones, portable transmitters and binoculars.

19. Upon arrival of the Inspection Team and the observers at the main entrance of the first facility they were welcomed by the facility commander and accompanied to a briefing room which subsequently served for inspectors as a working room.

The facility commander, using a layout site plan of the depot, described the location and functions of its structures, delimitation line between the administrative and storage areas, informed about their size; number of stores and open storage areas; types of munitions stores there; road/rail transport entrance/exit point and informed on safety measures during the inspection. The inspectors and observers agreed not to divulge information not connected with the inspection objectives.

The facility commander pledged full cooperation of the facility management with the Inspection Team at all stages of the inspection.

The management of the facility proposed a route of passage of inspectors from one storage to another which, in its opinion, would enable the inspection team to obtain the necessary information to achieve the aims of the inspection. The possibility of performing an introductory tour of the facility along the proposed route was also envisaged. The commander's introduction was followed by a discussion during which inspectors asked a number of questions concerning the inspected facility and received satisfactory answers.

20. After an initial examination of the documentation relevant to the depot's activities, the Inspection Team Leader decided that the Inspection Team would not conduct the introductory tour of the facility in view of its long duration and the necessity of devoting more time to the main inspection activities in the storage area. The Inspection Team Leader proposed a detailed inspection plan which specified on the lay-out site plan handed out to inspectors, the route and structures to be inspected.

The proposed inspection plan provided for the inspection of nine munition bunkers and stores and two points for loading /unloading munitions. The Inspection Team Leader reserved his right to make changes in the course of the inspection in the inspection plan proposed by him.

21. During the inspection, inspectors had unimpeded access to all bunkers, and stores and loading/unloading points selected by them.

The inspectors compared markings on the boxes with those on the munitions inside. As a result of the examination of the munitions no indications were discovered that they contained chemical warfare agents (lack of filling holes, plugs, specific markings or codes). A highly sensitive photo-ionisation analyzer of organic compound vapours was used during the inspection and gave negative results. Inspectors decided to carry out a random examination of two artillery shells using non-destructive methods. The measurement performed

with the portable ultrasonic device determined a solid material in both shells. In the light of the above, there was no need to take samples from munitions for examination.

22. During the inspection, inspectors paid particular attention to other factors which might have indicated the presence of chemical weapons. These factors are, for example, as follows:

- specific features of bunkers and stores (possibility of their hermetization, presence of air filter-ventilation systems);

- presence of protective and decontamination equipment or individual protective clothing in excess of ordinary requirements;

- presence of first-aid medicines for treatment of poisoning with toxic chemicals;

- presence of toxic chemicals detection and warning systems inside stores;

- specific provisions in safety instructions;

- presence of equipment and installations for utilisation (burning) of chemicals.

Findings in this regard were negative.

23. While inspecting bunkers and stores, the Inspection Team examined the pertinent documentation on stored munitions.

24. Upon completion of the inspection activities at the first facility, the Inspection Team Leader prepared in duplicate a preliminary report (Annex A). Its principal conclusion was that no chemical weapon or its traces were found.

25. On the second day, the Inspection Team arrived at the chemical depot, the second inspected facility.

The initial procedures including briefing and questioning by inspectors were identical to those undertaken during the first day of inspection. Since in the case of a chemical depot, the presence of chemical defence equipment could not be regarded as an indication of the presence of chemical weapons, the question of other indicators of a possible chemical weapon presence was thoroughly considered. As a result, the inspectors reached the conclusion that in such a case, inspection of all storage sites, including examination of documentation on stored chemicals and equipment was necessary.

Accordingly, the Inspection Team had unimpeded access to:

- all storage sites of the facility;

- loading/unloading sites;

- a chemical laboratory;

- all other areas of the facility, including metal waste storage areas;

- requested documentation.

The photo-ionisation analyzer (type 580A) was used and gave negative results.

Upon completion of the inspection activities, the Inspection Team Leader prepared in duplicate a preliminary report (Annex B). Its principal conclusion was that no chemical weapon or its traces were found.

26. After the Inspection, the Inspection Team, the observers and the representatives of the escort returned to the Headquarters of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of Poland. During a short final meeting, both parties summed up the results of the inspection. Both Parties concluded that the exercise had been carried out in a very cooperative spirit and that all its aims had been achieved. They agreed to issue a joint press communiqué to the effect that no chemical weapons or their signs were found.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The trial inspection reaffirmed the value of the concept of inspection on request as an indispensable element for the verification of the compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. It also indicated that it was possible to protect confidential information and information not relevant to chemical weapons without compromising the main objectives of the inspection.

2. A request for inspection should, to the extent possible, clearly identify the nature of suspicion. It would considerable facilitate the task of the Technical Secretariat to select inspectors with appropriate qualifications and suitable equipment to fulfil the aims of the inspection.

3. The trial inspection showed that cooperation between the Inspected State with the Inspection Team was conducive to a speedy and effective conclusion of the inspection.

4. The experience gained during the inspection shows that the Inspection Team should have a right of access to any place within the inspection site. It does not exclude a possibility of preparing a flexible enough inspection plan which could enable the completion of the inspection at the stage when sufficient evidence is obtained that doubts or suspicion in the request were unwarranted.

Annex A

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM

1. Participating Parties:

a) the Requesting Party	The Republic of Poland
b) the Inspected Party	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

2. Site of the inspection: The central artillery depot of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of the Republic of Poland

3. Timing :

a) arrival of the Inspection Team	17 April 1991 10.00 a.m.
b) departure of the Inspection Team	17 April 1991 8.00 p.m.
c) duration of the inspection	10 hours

4. Results of the inspection:

4.1. The Inspection Team inspected 9 stores and bunkers for storing munitions and 2 sites for loading/unloading artillery munitions which constitute approximately 15 per cent of the total number of structures at the depot.

4.2 No traces of activities indicating the presence of chemical weapons were discovered.

4.3 No traces were discovered of the presence of any chemical artillery munitions, including unfilled munitions, any special devices for filling and using chemical weapons or chemicals included in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/1033).

4.4. No factors were discovered which would indicate the presence of chemical weapons (namely, presence of air treatment systems in stores, stocks of protective and decontamination means in stores or in the immediate vicinity of them, specially guarded areas on the territory of the facility, systems detecting chemical warfare agents in the air and appropriate warning systems, instructions for actions or personnel in emergency situations in connection with chemical weapons, absence in the general system of documentation of data

on operational activities related to any store or other sections of the facility, presence of stores from which their content was removed prior to the arrival of the Inspection Team).

CONCLUSION

No chemical weapons or their traces were discovered.

Signature:

Leader of the Inspection Team

Annex B

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INSPECTION TEAM

1. Participating Parties

a) the Requesting Party	The Republic of Poland
b) the Inspected Party	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

2. Site of the inspection : The central chemical depot of the Soviet Troops located on the territory of the Republic of Poland

3. Timing:

a) arrival of the Inspection Team	18 April 1991 8.00 a.m.
b) departure of the Inspection Team	18 April 1991 4.00 p.m.
c) duration of the inspection	8 hours

4. Results of the inspection:

4.1. The Inspection Team inspected all stores of the depot, a chemical laboratory, tanks containing a decontamination substance and all other areas of the depot.

4.2. No traces of activities indicating the presence of chemical weapons were discovered.

4.3. No traces were discovered of the presence of chemical munitions or chemicals included in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/1033) or any special devices for filling and using chemical weapons.

4.4 No factors were discovered which would indicate the presence of chemical weapons (namely, presence of air treatment systems in stores, specially guarded areas on the territory of the facility, systems detecting chemical warfare agents in the air and appropriate warning systems, instructions for actions of personnel in emergency situations in connection with chemical weapons, absence in the general system of documentation of data

on operational activities related to any store or other sections of the facility, presence of stores from which their content was removed immediately prior to the arrival of the Inspection Team).

CONCLUSION

No chemical weapons or their traces were discovered.

Signature:

Leader of the Inspection Team